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COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS 
by 
RICHARD WILBUR 
Professor of English, Wesleyan University 
June 12, 1960 
COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS 
MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, MEMBERS OF THE 
GRADUATING CLASS, 
I admit to being both a poet and a professor; but I beg leave to 
simplify myself this afternoon. With your permission, I'll speak as a 
poet only, and attempt to apply some of the prejudices of the poet to 
the subject of education. 
The advantages of having been educated are obvious, I should 
hope; but every gain entails a loss, and for every virtue there is a 
vice. I'm going to talk a little about some of the losses and vices to 
which the educated person is liable. It's a virtue of the educated per-
son that he is not a prisoner of subjectivity; he is not confined to 
making statements like "I can't stand broccoli" or "the earth looks 
mighty flat to m e." H e is committed to processes of investigation 
and definition which can lead to some agreement on general truths -
that the earth is an oblate spheroid, for example. And even in matters 
of taste, where the merits of broccoli or Picasso are at issue, he con-
tinually seeks to enlarge the province of the discussable. This is a 
great virtue, but it has an attendant vice which a remark of the poet 
William Carlos Williams may serve to illustrate. Suppose, Dr. Williams 
said, that there were two doors, and that over one door there was a 
sign reading This way to see God and over the other a sign reading 
This way to hear a lecture about God. "Where do you think the crowd 
would go?" he asked. A crowd of educated people would be all too 
likely to attend the lecture, because educated people are prone to sub-
scribe to that eloquent half-truth of Wallace Stevens', "Life consists/ 
Of propositions about life." 
But the world is not a forensic society; and it is not true that only 
the formulated exists. Much of our life, thank heavens, is immediate, 
primitive, disorderly, and dumb. If we are truly alive, we are involved 
in and with life far beyond our power to understand or communicate 
it. And it seems to me terribly important to preserve one's capacity 
for living so - both for its own sake, and because our most vital 
thoughts derive not from other thoughts, but from the realm of the 
thoughtless. A good poem, for example, is never merely the pleasing 
embodiment of existing ideas; it is also, as Eliot says, "a raid on the 
inarticulate," a temporary capture of the unorganized. And this is 
true, I think, not only of poems but of every vital formulation. 
Therefore we impoverish ourselves if we deny reality to what resists 
our categories, or seems irrelevant to them: hard and fast notions 
of relevance freeze the consciousness, and this is why poetry, with its 
commitment to maximum consciousness, so delights in the far-fetched, 
and in connecting disparate things: Spinoza and the smell of cooking; 
logic and the cry of the loon. Poetry's quarrel with the pretensions 
of the intellect is a perennial one. In some nineteenth-century poets 
such as Wordsworth and Tennyson, intellectuality was often treated 
as a form of sin, because consecutive thought separates men from the 
instinctual, the concrete, and the communal. The charge, I think, is 
just; but of course the educated person cannot be expected to give up 
the benefits of thinking on that account. What he should do is to try 
always to be aware of the estranging tendency of thought. That logical 
clarity which makes discussion possible is achieved at a great sacrifice 
of consciousness. We withdraw from life in order to be clear. And lest 
he forget that fact, I'd have every brain-worker tack up over his 
worktable some words which Alfred North Whitehead addressed to 
a Harvard doctoral candidate. "What you miss," Whitehead said, 
"- What you miss is the essential vagueness of things." 
Another virtue of the educated person is his courageous readiness 
to criticize the bases of his own conduct, the moral standards by 
which he lives. He shares Socrates' conviction that "the unexamined 
life is not worth living." That is a great and brave attitude; but there 
is something to be said against it, and Robert Frost once said it in a 
poem called The Generations of Men. In that poem, two descendants 
of an old New England family are speaking of their common heritage, 
and one of them observes, "It's the ideals that count; and those will 
bear some keeping still about." It appears to me that Socrates' demand 
for the examination of life, and Frost's demand that we keep still 
about our ideals, are directly contradictory and equally wise. Surely 
it is a good thing that so many of our college courses are designed 
to "shake the student up," as they say - to make him inquire what, 
if anything, might be meant by freedom, or truth, or justice, or good-
ness. It can strengthen us to put our inherited notions on trial, and 
make them define themselves. It can strengthen us to learn that the 
values of Cincinnati are not totally accepted by the Eskimo and the 
Balinese. It can strengthen us to apprehend the difficulty of judging, 
and to acknowledge that moral action is often tragically complex. 
And yet all of this is very risky, unless we are very wise. It is 
precisely in this field of thought that knowledge must conduce to 
action· it is here that we should least relish that form of intellectual 
play w'hich seeks out the logical cul-de-sac, or the paralyzing antithesis, 
and stops triumphantly there. Unless we continually remind our-
selves that reason by itself is a eunuch, the sophistication of our moral 
awareness is likely to reduce us to an obscene detachment. I once 
looked out my window and saw a distinguished intellectual standing 
on the sidewalk, and staring at an old woman who was gathering up 
the parcels she had dropped. They had fallen at his very feet, but 
he made no move to help her retrieve them, and indeed he looked 
incapable of motion. I don't suppose that he was weighing the pros 
and cons of the matter; there could hardly have been much to think 
about; but I suspect that a lifelong devotion to pros and cons was 
now paying off in a perfect incapacity for action. Such a spectacle 
is unlovely; and though I resent Plato's exclusion of poets from his 
metaphorical republic, I am glad that he chose to support his 
philosopher-kings with a class of auxiliaries, or lovers of honor, whose 
function was to do the obviously right thing. It seems to me that every 
nature, however complicated at the top, should contain a sort of 
soldier who knows damn well what his duty is. 
The ideal, of course, is to be subtle and simple at once, both 
serpent and dove. The intellectual criticism of values should not 
shame us out of whatever simplicities we can hold on to, any more 
than semantics should shame us out of the use of so-called emotive 
language. We've got to talk and we've got to act. The poet, like the 
intellectual, is devoted to the examination of life, but the poet 
stresses in man not merely the intellect but the whole being. It is 
poetry's implicit view that we cannot, in fact, measure everything 
with the rational mind; that we have a limited power to act upon 
rational conclusions; that we accept a great many of our beliefa on 
some authority, or out of some fidelity; and that the major decisions 
of our lives are largely emotional or spiritual, and based of necessity 
upon insufficient evidence. The educated person, though he may 
have vicariously confronted the absurd, and pondered the gratuitous 
act, and sat up all night transvaluating values, should not scorn to 
fall back at need on what his grandparents thought was true or good. 
We could do worse than to be loving and critical adaptors of the best 
of our inheritance. The most adventurous philosophic mind I know, 
a mind which appals me by what it is willing to entertain, belongs to 
a man who is utterly devoted to his country and its institutions, and 
whose moral reflexes are as quick and sure as Mr. Johansson's right 
hand. He is simple where he can manage it, just as Socrates was: you 
remember how the great questioner Socrates, though unjustly con-
demned, died piously and without question for the great principle 
of Law. 
Still another virtue of the educated person is curiosity: the feeling 
that there is something to be found out, and that one perhaps can 
find it. There's no need to say why curiosity is a good thing; and the 
quantity of research, discovery, and invention reported every year 
would indicate that we are still a vigorously curious nation. Yet I 
was troubled by something an Italian novelist said, on returning 
from a recent visit to America. He praised us handsomely for many 
things, but he had two adverse comments to make. First, he felt that 
the four-hour cocktail period is an institution dangerous to health. 
Second, and rather more importantly, he felt that the American in-
tellectual class has lost the habit of adventurous general reading. 
How much this second reproach had to do with the sales of his own 
books, I don't know; but I'm afraid it's true that our educated people 
in general have ceased to have that breadth of curiosity which we 
remember in the Franklins, the Jeffersons, the John Quincy Adamses 
- the great readers, lookers and tinkerers of an earlier America. 
Of course, the narrowing of curiosity is not a peculiarly American 
phenomenon. One finds it elsewhere, in England for example, and 
I remember reading, a good many years ago, an essay by Virginia 
Woolf on precisely this subject. If I remember rightly, she quoted 
as a reproof to our times a passage from the seventeenth-century diary 
of John Evelyn. In the passage quoted, Evelyn describes himself as 
seated in his garden, reading a book; a butterfly wanders by on the 
air, luring Evelyn's eye away from the page; the markings of the 
butterfly are unfamiliar to him, and so he sets down his book, rises 
from his chair, and stalks the butterfly to the end of the garden. 
Once it has come to rest on a flower, Evelyn observes its form and 
markings, carefully records them, and then - like Adam in his 
garden - gives the butterfly a name. 
If educated people kept diaries nowadays - and on the whole 
they don't - I'm afraid there would be very few entries of that kind. 
Too many of us have conceded the butterfly to the lepidopterist. If, 
while reading in the garden, we notice a butterfly unknown to us, we 
abort our cunosity at once by the reflection that somewhere, no 
doubt, the creature has been described, and named, and classified 
by the proper authorities. Perhaps we make a pious resolution to look 
it up sometime, and then we return to our book - which, of course, 
is on a subject connected with our specialty. It's not that the educated 
person lacks curiosity nowadays; it's that he feels he must ruthlessly 
prune his curiosity in order to make it bear fruit. The libraries are 
so big; so much is expertly known; each discipline has advanced so 
far; one must read and study so much before one can hope to make a 
contribution in any field. And one's sense of the magnitude of one's 
own field dissuades one from trespassing idly on any other. One 
therefore leaves trees to the botanist, engines to the engineer, the 
heavens to Harlow Shapley, and God, perhaps, to the Department 
of Religion. 
Paradoxically, then, that desire to know which brings us to the 
academy can become so narrowly focused that the educated person 
has no wholeness of vision, and is less conversant with his total 
environment than some unlettered savage. Gibbon, toward the end 
of his history, assures us that no catastrophe, however great, will 
ever stamp out human civilization altogether, because there are certain 
fundamental arts of civilization which men will never forget: the 
use of fire and domestic animals, rudimentary navigation, the cul-
tivation of grain, the methods of hunting and fishing, and "the simple 
practice of the mechanic trades." I can only say that today there 
are some people so insanely specialized that I would not trust them 
to remember even these most fundamental things. 
Doubtless there can be happiness, and a kind of heroism, in a life 
which harps forever and expertly on one string: we are at least half-
persuaded of this by Browning's grammarian, who lived only for 
grammar, and wore himself out in establishing the "doctrine of the 
enclitic De." But it seems to me that for most people such shrinkage 
of concern is not only sad but impractical. When the various human 
creature is docked of his divergent impulses, and forced wholly into 
the mould of the specialist, surely it is done at a sacrifice in spon-
taneity; and surely his work ceases in great measure to be play. When 
work ceases to be play, it ceases to be vital and inventive, and we do 
not need D. H. Lawrence and the other poets to tell us so. Again, 
if it's discovery one is after, is it not true that the greatest discoveries 
have been made, not through exclusive adherence to some one study, 
but by bold violations of established method, by surprising analogies, 
and by cross-pollinations from field to field? These practical objections 
may or may not hold in the particular case; but poetry has an ob-
jection to narrowed consciousness which, though hard to express, is 
stronger and even more practical. The deepest need of the human 
creature is somehow to know, to feel, and to imagine his world not 
through any one way of knowing, but with his entire awareness. As 
Thomas Traherne said, 
. You neve~ enjoy the world aright, till the Sea 
itself floweth m your veins, till you are clothed with 
the heavens, and crowned with the stars, and perceive 
yourself to be sole heir of the world . . . 
It is this longing to "enjoy the world aright" which poetry chiefly 
serves and celebrates in those perilous and provisional unities which 
we call poems. And therefore poetry is always asking, by implication, 
that if we must be experts, we be dilettantes too; that we surrender 
no object of knowledge, nor any way of knowing; and that even in 
this disintegrating age, we try for our happiness' sake to look at 
everything, to inquire into everything, and to delight in everything. 
I had thought of saying, at this point, a number of things about 
the subject which most nearly concerns me: that is, words and 
language. For one thing, I wanted to argue that, in the interest of 
versatile consciousness, the educated person should choose Enalish as 
his basic language, rather than, for instance, the dialect of th: social 
sciences. But I've run on too long about other matters, and so I'll 
close with one fairly brief observation about words which will sum-
marize much of what I've been attempting to say. 
The intellectual uses words mainly to designate, to describe, to 
define, to distinguish. And poetry, despite its reputation for cloudi-
ness, also aspires to precision of every kind: it tries to capture the 
thing in its uniqueness, it aims at clarity of argument and exactness 
of feeling. The intellectual and the poet, then, are both engaged in 
selecting and excluding, in chopping up the world. But there is a 
~ontra_ry pu~ose in the words of poetry, and this contrary purpose 
is radical to its nature. The essential impulse of poetry is to create 
metaphor; and a metaphor is a perception of resemblance, expressed 
as a perception of identity. Poetry says that the tree is a cloud that 
the boat is a bird, that the light in the window is a star. Whe~ one 
talks this way, one is seriously threatening to cancel the distinctions 
between things; one is threatening to destroy the very words by which 
we make distinctions; one is gesturing, in fact, toward that magic 
wordless wood which Lewis Carroll described in Alice Through the 
Looking-Glass. 
Perhaps some of you remember the passage I'm referring to -
though many readers forget it, because its tone is so uncharacteristic 
of the book as a whole. What happens is that Alice, having finished 
an absurd conversation with some insects, walks across a field and 
into a wood. The shade of the trees is cool, and she starts to remark 
gratefully on the fact, but finds that she can't, because she can't think 
of the word for "tree." The reason for this is that she has strayed 
into a magic wood where things have no names. 
While Alice is standing there dumbstruck, a little fawn trots into 
view, and Alice asks him who he is. This being the wood where things 
have no names, the fawn can't tell her; nor can Alice herself say 
who she is. This puts them both at their ease; Alice embraces the 
little fawn, and they walk along together in a charmed and affectionate 
silence, until they come to the end of the wood, and emerge once 
again into sunlight. There, the fawn suddenly cries out, "Now I 
remember who I am. I'm a fawn - and you're a girl." And having 
made this distinction, he races off in fear. 
The poet inclines to think that Lewis Carroll's wordless wood is 
not a sentimental fantasy but a quite real place. And what he respect-
fully asks the intellectual sometimes to imagine, is that beyond the 
names and words by which we multiply distinctions, there may be 
a single world; that beyond the spectrum of our sciences there may 
be an undivided light in which all things are seen to share one nature 
and one life. 
I have spoken so much of the risks and losses involved in education, 
that I'm afraid I may seem to have been negative or perverse; let 
me hasten to say in closing that, though I mean what I've said, I am 
sure that the educated person has a better chance than any to be a 
whole person in a whole world. Therefore, my respectful congratula-
tions to the members of the Class of 1960. 
